The Hidden Effects of Opening Bids in Online Auctions by Muthitacharoen, Achita (Mi)
Thirty Third International Conference on Information Systems, Orlando 2012 1 
THE HIDDEN EFFECTS OF OPENING BIDS IN 
ONLINE AUCTIONS 
Research-in-Progress 
Achita (Mi) Muthitacharoen 
Wichita State University 
1845 N. Fairmount St. Box 77 Wichita, KS 67260 
achita.muthita@wichita.edu  
Abstract 
Auction opening bid is one of the online auction features that can be manipulated to 
promote bidding activity. Oftentimes, auction sellers that expect high bidding volume 
set their opening bids low only to later realize a lower price premium in their auctions. 
The current study offers explanations to this phenomenon by approaching this situation 
in a more holistic way. It examines the impacts of auction opening bids on bidding 
behaviors. Auction data from eBay were collected and separated into two samples, 
including auctions with low and high opening bids (LOB and HOB auctions). We found 
that HOB auctions attracted more serious bidders as indicated by their commitment to 
stay longer in the auctions. We also found that some bidding strategies that were 
commonly considered undesirable by auction sellers produced positive price premium 
to HOB auctions but not to its counterparts. Theoretical and pragmatic implications are 
later offered in the study. 
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Introduction 
In online auction environments, auction sellers and bidders employ different strategies with an effort to 
achieve their auction goals. For sellers, their goals are generally 1) to sell their items (Akula and Menascé, 
2007) and 2) to gain a higher price premium (Bapna et al. 2009; Fu and Chen 2011; Harstad 1990). Price 
premium was defined as a price received by sellers, which is above the average price for which the same 
products are sold (Ba and Pavlou 2002). Buyers however strategize 1) to win the auctions, 2) to pay the 
least amount for the items they won, and 3) to minimize auction monitoring costs (Bapna et al. 2004; 
Ockenfels and Roth 2006; Roth and Ockenfels 2002). Depending upon their situations, sellers and buyers 
may attempt to attain multiple goals in one auction and they therefore have to prioritize their goals. 
Sellers that have a pressing need to move their inventory quickly may have to set the opening bids of their 
auctions relatively low to ensure a materialized auction but have to face with an inherent risk of receiving 
marginal final prices. Bidders that cannot be available at the time the auction ends are forced to place 
their bids early and take risks of revealing their true valuation of the item they are bidding on to others.  
While there are myriad studies that examined sellers’ and bidder’s strategies in online auction 
environment, they for the most part viewed these strategies as separate entities (i.e. Bapna et al. 2004; 
Lucking-Reiley et al. 2007). None, to the best of our knowledge, investigate where sellers’ and bidders’ 
strategies crossed and provided an integrated picture of the interconnectedness of these strategies. The 
current study strives to do just that and attempts to answer a question of “Can a seller’s choice of strategy 
influence bidder’s choice of strategy and its effectiveness in online auctions?”. 
We argue that integrating the concept of sellers’ and buyers’ strategies in online auction together can help 
answer some questions that remain in the online auction research. For instance, although previous 
studies has often witnessed higher price premium in the auctions with high opening bids (HOB auctions) 
than auctions with low opening bids (LOB auctions) (i.e. Lucking-Reiley et al. 2007), there is very little 
theoretical explanation offered to the online auction community. We argue that the explanation to this 
phenomenon lies in the hidden impacts of seller’s choice of opening bid on bidders’ strategy and the 
integration of bidders’ and sellers’ strategies have to therefore be put under a microscope.  
The current study chose seller’s opening bid strategy and examined its impact on bidder’s behaviors 
because of two major reasons. First, opening bids is one of the most popular options offered by online 
auctioneers to sellers in the process of auction listing. Second, it reflects conflicting goals between online 
auctioneers and online sellers. Many online auctioneers such as eBay encourage auction sellers to adopt 
low opening bid (LOB) strategy by charging lower listing fee. LOB auctions are more likely to receive a bid 
and thereafter become materialized, guaranteeing a final commission fees to the auctioneers. Auction 
sellers that attempt to minimize their listing fee are attracted to the LOB option. By adopting the LOB 
strategy, they take a hidden risk of gaining lower price premium. On the other hand, setting a high 
opening bid provides sellers with some assurance that a certain price level will be received. Sellers who are 
more risk averse can set their opening bid higher to have a certain guarantee of auction final prices 
(Walley and Fortin 2005). Some sellers however are willing to take risk because they believe that lower 
opening bids encourage bidding wars in the auctions (Reynolds et al. 2009). While it is true that bidding 
wars are more commonly found in LOB auctions, it may not suffice to produce higher price premium. The 
current study therefore offered an alternative outlook and rationale that explain higher price premium 
found in auctions with the HOB strategy.  
Theory Development 
In the online auction research stream, many attempts have been made to study strategies adopted by 
online bidders and their effectiveness (Bapna et al. 2004; Hou and Rego 2007; Roth and Ockenfels 2002). 
Of these studies, Bapna and his colleagues proposed a systematic way to profile bidders in online auction. 
Three bidder variables, including their number of bids, time of entry (TOE), and time of exit (TOX), were 
used to perform cluster analyses on their two data sets (1999 and 2000). Their study discovered four 
common bidder classes/strategies in the two samples, including opportunists, evaluators, sip & dippers 
(S&D), and participators. Evaluators and opportunists shared one common trait – that is they generally 
placed a single bid in the auction in which they are taking part. The timings of their bids are however 
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different and signified their motivations. While evaluators are likely to enter their bids early and used 
their true valuation of the items in forming their bids, opportunists are likely to wait until the last 
minutes. Since evaluators put out their bids early, they allow other bidders to experiment on their bids – 
or to test the water. This bidding strategy was therefore found to be the least effective to win but it 
generated highest price to the sellers on average (Bapna et al. 2004).   
Opportunists waited until the last minute so that they can learn from other bidders and form their bids 
accordingly. To learn about other bidders in the auctions, they incurred higher monitoring cost. Bapna et 
al. (2004) reported that this strategy yielded the highest pay-off in term of winning likelihood. Some 
researchers considered this bidding strategy undesirable since this strategy produced a risk of having a 
non-materialized auction (Bapna et al. 2001; Bapna 2003; Roth and Ockenfels 2002). Some even made 
suggestions of how to discourage this bidding strategy such as using a soft-closing auction rule, a rule that 
allows the auction’s end time to be extended depending upon the bidding activities in the last minutes (i.e. 
Roth and Ockenfels 2002).  
Participators are those that placed multiple bids and they generally entered each bid only at the minimum 
requirement (Bapna et al. 2004). They avoided using their true valuation as their bid amount. Their role 
in shaping auction price premium has however been inconclusive. In their early study, participators were 
found to gain higher surpluses in the auctions (Bapna et al. 2004). It was later found that the larger 
number of participators, the higher price premium received by an auction (Bapna et al. 2009). S&D was 
claimed to place two bids on average. Their winning likelihood was found to be on the high end but the 
auctions won by these bidders gained lower price premium (Bapna et al. 2004). Two other bidder classes, 
including agent bidders and middle evaluators, were discovered but they appeared only in one of the two 
samples. For more information about these bidder classes/strategies, please see Bapna et al. (2004).  
The current study argues that seller’s choice of auction strategies can alter bidder’s strategies, their 
popularity, and their outcomes. To test this argument, we shed a spotlight to one of the most popular 
seller’s strategies – seller’s opening bids. This strategy has repeatedly been included in many online 
auction research. Seller’s decision of auction opening bid is arguably tied directly to the bid activities in 
the auctions. LOB auctions generally have more bidders than HOB auctions (Bajari and Hortacsu 2003; 
Lucking-Reiley 2000; Reynolds et al. 2009). They also avail more opportunities for bidders to experiment 
since they leave a relatively larger gap between their possible final price and their beginning price point.  
Although research in the area of online bidding behavior is an emerging topic in IS studies, we argue that 
some of the influences of seller’s opening bid strategy on bidding behaviors can be predicted. For instance, 
bidders that adopt evaluator strategy face a risk of revealing their true valuation of the product they are 
bidding to others. To avoid revealing their true valuation, bidders that employ this strategy may prefer 
LOB auctions. These auctions project a larger space between the auction starting price and their highest 
bids, making it more difficult to others to figure out their true valuation. Thus, one may expect a larger 
proportion of evaluators in the LOB auction (H1a). Since S&D are bidders that employ few bids strategy, 
they are assuming similar risks faced by evaluators. By participating in the LOB auctions, the risk of 
unveiling their true valuations of product can be minimized. H1c therefore reflects the similar expectation 
of S&D distribution across the two opening bid strategies.  
Unlike evaluators, opportunists have higher monitoring costs since they generally wait until the last 
minutes before placing their bids. Participating in the auctions with low opening bids can increase their 
monitoring costs because the auction prices in this auction setting can change more dynamically. To avoid 
such costs, opportunists may opt to participate more in the HOB auctions where there are fewer bidding 
activities. Thus, we expect a smaller proportion of opportunists in the LOB auctions than in the HOB 
auctions (H1b). This expectation will however change for the participator strategy. Of all bidder classes 
found by Bapna et al. (2004), participators was the one that exhibits a bidding behavior similar to 
incremental bidding behavior (Ockenfels and Roth 2006). Incremental bids are bids that are placed only 
to meet the minimum bid amount requirement (Ockenfels and Roth 2006). Participators adopt this 
strategy and do it multiple times in the auctions in which they are taking part. LOB auctions provide an 
environment conducive for this bidding strategy because they have more room for bidders to enter 
multiple bids in smaller increment. H1d below echoes the attractiveness of LOB auctions to participators. 
H1: Distributions of bidder classes/strategies in LOB  and HOB auctions are significantly different.  
H1a: There is a larger proportion of evaluators in LOB auctions than in HOB auctions. 
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H1b: There is a smaller proportion of opportunists in LOB auctions than in HOB auctions. 
H1c: There is a larger proportion of S&D in LOB auctions than in HOB auctions.  
H1d: There is a larger proportion of participators in LOB auctions than in HOB auctions. 
Not only can seller’s choice of opening bids affect distribution/popularity of bidder strategy, it can play an 
important role in determining the winning outcomes or winning effectiveness of each strategy. For 
instance, evaluators that participate in the HOB auctions, although may implicitly disclose their 
valuations of the products they are bidding on, send an important message to other bidders. Their bids 
portrait their commitment and aggression to win because their bids are in close proximity to the upward 
price ceiling derived from previous auctions that sold identical items. This message may potentially propel 
other bidders from the auction, rendering a higher winning likelihood (H2a). Thus, we expect a smaller 
proportion of auctions won by evaluators in the LOB setting than in the HOB setting. A similar argument 
can be made for the bidders that employ opportunist strategy. Opportunists that are engaged in the HOB 
auctions minimize a chance for others to respond to their bids, not only because of their bid timing but 
also because of a smaller gap between price points. Thus, we can expect a larger proportion of auctions 
won by opportunists in the HOB setting, and vice versa (H2b). 
On the contrary, we expect a larger proportion of auctions won by S&D in the LOB auctions (H2c). 
Although evaluators and S&D generally placed fewer bids to the auctions, S&D exhibits a more flexible 
bidding behavior since they generally place two bids on average as opposed to a single bid placed by 
evaluators (Bapna et al. 2004). Their willingness to adjust their bids will pay off but more in an auction 
setting that facilitates such a bid adjustment – case in point, the LOB auctions. The LOB auction setting 
should have a similar impact on the winning likelihood of bidders that employ participator strategy since 
LOB auctions provide more room for participators to experiment their bids on a more frequent basis. H2d 
therefore hypothesize that there is a larger proportion of auctions won by participators in the LOB setting.  
H2: Distribution of winner classes/winning strategies in LOB auctions is significantly different from 
that in HOB auctions.  
H2a: There is a smaller proportion of auctions won by evaluators in LOB setting than in HOB setting. 
H2b: There is a smaller proportion of auctions won by opportunists in LOB setting in HOB setting. 
H2c: There is a larger proportion of auctions won by S&D in LOB setting than in HOB setting. 
H2d: There is a larger proportion of auctions won by participators in LOB setting than in HOB 
setting. 
 
Another outcome of bidding strategy that has received tremendous attention from online auction 
researchers is the price premium generated by winners that adopted various strategies. In their initial 
work, Bapna and his colleagues found that opportunists are perhaps the least desirable bidders to auction 
sellers mainly because they are likely to enter their bids within the last minutes of the auctions. They also 
gained higher surpluses – producing lower price premiums to the auction that they won (Bapna et al. 
2004). We however believe that opportunists have limited opportunity to observe and learn from other 
bidders when they participate in the HOB auctions. It is because these auctions have fewer bidders and 
bids. Thus, opportunists in HOB auctions are obliged to use their true valuation of the items to form their 
bids and potentially produce higher price premium to the auction they won. Although we expect varying 
price premium of other bidder strategies across the LOB and HOB auctions, the current study proposes a 
price premium hypothesis that is directionless and similar to those found in the baseline study (Bapna et 
al. 2004). This decision stems from the mixed findings from previous research (Bapna et al. 2004; Bapna 
et al. 2009) that renders no a priori assumptions regarding the direction of possible differences of price 
premium.  
To fairly compare price premium of LOB and HOB auctions won by similar bidder strategy, one should 
take seller’s reputations and their other strategies into account. Auctions in an electronic marketplace can 
be offered by different sellers – each has their own level of trustworthiness. Many online auctioneers such 
as eBay offer an opportunity to their buyers to leave a feedback after the transaction is complete. Buyers 
that are satisfied with their transactions can leave a positive feedback to the sellers. Such feedback is a 
valuable asset to the sellers because it helps the sellers gain more trust from their future buyers and will 
later be rewarded with a higher price premium (Ba and Pavlou 2002; Resnick et al. 2000). In contrast, 
sellers that did not honor their term of contract can be tagged with a negative feedback and the price 
premium of their future auctions can be compromised (Ba and Pavlou 2002; Pavlou and Dimoka 2006).  
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Besides the heterogeneities of sellers’ reputation, each auction may differ by seller’s other choices of 
strategies. Auction duration is another strategy that has been put to test frequently by auction sellers and 
researchers. It was reported that auction duration when being extended can help enhance auction price 
premium since it allows more exposure of the auction to a larger base of buyers (Reynolds et al. 2009). 
Thus, to fairly compare price premium of auctions won by similar bidder strategy, both seller’s reputation 
and auction duration should be included in the equation and we propose; 
H3: There is a significant difference of price premium in LOB and HOB auctions won by a similar 
bidder class after controlling for sellers’ reputation and auction duration.   
H3a: LOB and HOB auctions won by evaluators will receive significantly different price premium 
after controlling for sellers’ reputation and auction duration.  
H3b: LOB and HOB auctions won by opportunists will receive significantly different price premium 
after controlling for sellers’ reputation and auction duration.  
H3c: LOB and HOB auctions won by S&D will receive significantly different price premium after 
controlling for sellers’ reputation and auction duration.  
H3d: LOB and HOB auctions won by participators will receive significantly different price premium 
after controlling for sellers’ reputation and auction duration.  
Methods 
To test the above hypotheses, auction data from eBay were collected over the two-month period during 
April and May 2010. iPads were selected as a product of interest due to two main reasons, its availability 
and commodity nature. Its commodity-like characteristic allows a fair comparison of price premium 
across the auctions. Two spider programs were developed to facilitate data collection process – one is to 
automatically select the auctions that offered the product of interest and the other is to monitor the 
selected auctions and download auction data after the auctions end. The program later extracted 
information pertaining to each bidder such as their number of bids, TOE, and TOX. TOE and TOX are 
elapsed number of seconds between their bid time and the auction end time. Since iPads come with many 
configurations, this study focused only on New iPad with 16 GB and WIFI features.  
The initial sample produced 11,290 data points – of which are mostly irrelevant data such as iPad 
accessories, used iPad, or those that are bundled with other items. Such auctions were later eliminated 
from the sample. Auctions that ended prematurely or ended with buy-it-now option were also removed 
from the sample, rendering an immediate sample of 890 auctions.  To examine the impacts of seller’s 
opening bid strategy on bidder’s behaviors, we chose auctions within two opening bid ranges, including 1) 
those that are $0.99 and under (LOB auctions) and 2) those that are $499 and above (HOB auctions).  
The final sample contains 315 LOB auctions with 3,780 bidders and 345 HOB auctions with 904 bidders. 
It is clear that the LOB strategy helps attract larger number of bidders. LOB auctions however received 
significantly lower average total price of $589.37, as opposed to the average total price of $598.33 found 
in the HOB auctions (p = 0.04). The reported average total prices, which is a sum of auction final price 
and shipping fees, are adjusted after taking into account the heterogeneity of other seller’s factors and 
strategies across the two samples. The average total price of the immediate sample is $590.29 and we 
used this average to calculate the price premium of the two samples – an approach that was suggested by 
Ba and Pavlou (2002). Others auction variables, such as auction duration, seller’s positive and negative 
feedback, were also extracted and later used as covariates in the price premium comparison tests.  
Data Analysis and Results 
It is interesting to find that LOB auctions, despite its ability to draw more bidders and potential to create a 
bidding war, received a significantly lower average total price than HOB auctions. This finding is however 
consistent to prior studies in this area (i.e. Lucking-Reiley et al. 2007). We believe that such finding is 
attributed the types of bidders participating in the auctions. To understand why LOB auctions received 
lower premium than HOB auctions, the current study profiled bidders in the two auction samples (LOB 
and HOB auctions) separately. We followed the cluster analysis technique used by Bapna and his 
colleagues (Bapna et al. 2004) and used bidders’ number of bids, TOE, and TOX as clustering variables. 
To indentify the proper number of clusters in each sample, a guideline offered by Hair and his colleagues 
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(Hair et al. 1998) was adopted. The data suggested six clusters in each sample. The distribution of bidder 
classes in each sample and their cluster variable statistics are summarized in Table 1. Statistics pertaining 
average TOE and TOX in Table 1 are shown in number of minutes.  
Table 1: Cluster Analysis Results in Auctions with Low and High Opening Bids 
 
 
Bidder Groups 
Auctions with Low Opening Bids (LOB) Auctions with High Opening Bids (HOB) 
Number of 
Members 
AVG Number 
of Bids 
(S.D.)  
AVG TOE 
(S.D.) 
AVG TOX 
(S.D.) 
Number of 
Members 
AVG Number 
of Bids 
(S.D.)  
AVG TOE 
(S.D.) 
AVG TOX 
(S.D.) 
Early Evaluators 
283 1.49 8,629.71 8,462.79 7 1.00 7,964.34 7,964.34 
7.49% (0.94) (2,221.77) (2,254.48) 0.77% (0.00) (1,566.31) (1,566.31) 
Middle Evaluators 
n/a n/a n/a n/a 55 1.36 2,071.68 1,769.10 
    6.08% (0.85) (1,007.74) (1,133.15) 
Late Evaluators 
824 1.00 1,193.92 1,193.92 78 1.00 568.37 568.37 
21.80% (0.00) (423.43) (423.43) 8.63% (0.00) (176.81) (176.81) 
Opportunists 
1,155 1.00 157.30 157.30 579 1.00 64.71 64.71 
30.56% (0.00) (163.60) (163.60) 64.05% (0.00) (86.96) (86.96) 
Early S&D 
450 2.24 4,114.98 3,525.94 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
11.90% (1.84) (1,499.09) (1,346.15)     
Middle S&D 
873 2.49 634.50 525.78 137 2.00 158.71 112.49 
23.10% (0.70) (542.82) 508.71 15.15% (0.00) (268.17) (216.09) 
Participators 
195 7.89 1,387.38 851.48 48 3.71 166.66 41.77 
5.16% (4.14) (1,416.12) (997.90) 5.31% (1.05) (414.47) (80.33) 
Total Bidders 3,780 904 
Our analyses discovered similar bidder classes found in the Bapna’s study (Bapna et al. 2004). This result 
confirmed that number of bids, TOE, and TOX hold their segregating power very well. For instance, the 
average number of bids placed by evaluators and opportunists are approximately 1.0. Opportunists 
however placed their bids much closer to the end of the auctions – approximately 2.5 hours and 1 hour 
before the auctions ended for LOB and HOB samples, respectively (See Table 1).  Timing of bids has 
however extended its segregating power to some bidder classes in our samples. For instance, evaluators 
were classified into 3 groups in the HOB auctions according to their TOE and TOX, including early, 
middle and late evaluators. S&D in the LOB auctions were also further classified into early and middle 
S&D. Early evaluators and S&D are those that came and left the auctions early (as indicated by their TOE 
and TOX) while middle/late evaluators or S&D placed their bids closer to the end of auctions.  
This extended segregating power was also witnessed in one of the Bapna’s samples where evaluators were 
separated into early and middle evaluators (Bapna et al. 2004). Although both samples revealed six 
clusters of bidders, their bidder classes are not all identical. The two samples have only 5 bidder classes in 
common. Each also has their own unique bidder classes – middle evaluators in HOB auctions and early 
S&D in the LOB auctions (See Table 1). Winning likelihood, average total price, and average price 
premium of each bidder class are reported in Table 2.  
To test H1, bidder classes found in our study were aggregated into the four common bidder classes for a 
comparison purpose (See Table 3). A chi-square test was performed. Its result supported H1 (X2 = 492.23: 
X2.05, 3 = 7.81) and revealed that distribution of bidder classes across the LOB and HOB auctions are 
significantly different. A similar test was performed on the distribution of winners across the two samples 
and it yielded a similar finding (X2 = 143.03: X2.05, 3 = 7.81). Thus, we can claim that the distributions of 
winners across the two auction samples are also significantly different (H2).  
Using auction duration, seller’s positive, and negative feedbacks as covariates, we conducted ANCOVA 
tests to examine the difference in price premium of auctions won by similar bidder classes across the two 
samples.  Prior to the test, seller’s positive and negative feedbacks have undergone a log transformation as 
suggested by Ba and Pavlou (2002). H3 is partially supported by ANCOVA results. The result unveiled that 
there is no significant difference in price premium generated by evaluators (H3b) and participators (H3d) 
across the two samples (P = 0.52 for evaluators, P =0.58 for participators). 
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Table 2: Distribution of Adjusted Prices and Winning Likelihood across Bidder Profiles 
 
Bidder Groups 
Auctions with Low Opening Bids (LOB) Auctions with High Opening Bids (HOB) 
Number 
of 
Auctions 
Won  
(% of 
Auctions) 
 Number of 
Winners  
(% of 
Bidders) 
Average 
Total 
Price 
Average 
Price 
Premium 
Number of 
Auctions 
Won (% of 
Auctions) 
 Number of 
Winners  
(% of 
Bidders) 
Average 
Total 
Price 
Average 
Price 
Premium 
Early 
Evaluators 
2 
(0.63%) 
2 
(0.71%) 
$676.27 14.60% 
2 
(0.58%) 
2 
(28.57%) 
$604.16 2.30% 
Middle 
Evaluators 
n/a n/a n/a n/a 
8 
(2.32%) 
8 
(14.55%) 
$592.14 0.3% 
Late Evaluators 
3 
(0.95%) 
3 
(0.36%) 
$575.57 -2.50% 
16 
(4.64%) 
16 
(20.51%) 
$603.24 2.20% 
Opportunists 
178 
(56.51%) 
178 
(15.41%) 
$583.53 -1.10% 
245 
(71.01%) 
245 
(42.31%) 
$596.23 1.00% 
Early S&D 
10 
(3.17%) 
10 
(2.22%) 
$579.74 -1.80% n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Middle S&D 
105 
(33.33%) 
105 
(12.03%) 
$594.57 0.7% 
47 
(13.62%) 
47 
(34.31%) 
$605.11 2.5% 
Participators 
17 
(5.40%) 
17 
(8.72%) 
$613.44 3.90% 
27 
(7.83%) 
27 
(56.25%) 
$605.83 2.30% 
Total Winners 315 345 
 
There is however a significant difference in price premium of auctions won by opportunists (H3a: P = 
0.05). Bidders that employed this strategy in the HOB auctions produced significantly higher price 
premium than those using the same strategy in the LOB auctions. S&D winners showed marginally 
difference in price premium across the two auction samples (H3c: P = 0.07). Although S&D winners in 
both samples produced positive premium, they paid less for the items when they used this strategy in the 
LOB auctions than in the HOB auctions. 
 
Table 3: Distribution of Adjusted Prices and Winning Likelihood across Aggregated Bidder Profiles 
Bidder 
Classes 
H1 and 
X2 values 
Number of Bidders H2 and  
X2 values 
Number of Auctions 
Won 
H3 and  
p-
values 
Average Price 
Premium/Total 
Price 
LOB HOB LOB HOB LOB HOB 
Evaluators 
H1a* 
X2 = 83.12 
1,107 
(29.30%) 
140 
(15.50%) 
H2a* 
X2 = 78.16 
5 
(1.59%) 
26 
(7.54%) 
H3a*** 
p = 0.05 
4.20% 
$615.13 
1.90% 
$601.23 
Opportunists 
H1b* 
X2 = 477.92 
1,155 
(30.60%) 
579 
(64.00%) 
H2b* 
X2 = 29.54 
178 
(56.51%) 
245 
(71.01%) 
H3b 
p = 0.52 
-0.90% 
$584.77 
0.90% 
$595.34 
Sip & 
Dippers 
H1c* 
X2 = 156.49 
1,323 
(35.00%) 
137 
(15.20%) 
H2c* 
X2 = 77.94 
115 
(36.51%) 
47 
(13.62%) 
H3c** 
p = 0.07 
0.20% 
$591.69 
3.0% 
$608.16 
Participators 
H1d 
X2 = 0.04 
195 
(5.20%) 
48 
(5.30%) 
H2d 
X2 = 3.98 
17 
(5.40%) 
27 
(7.83%) 
H3d 
p = 0.58 
3.90% 
$613.20 
2.7% 
$606.26 
* significant at p = 0.05 and d.f. =1,  ** significant at p =< 0.10, *** significant at p <= 0.05 
Discussion and Implications 
The current study offered insights into how seller’s opening bid strategy in online auctions influence 
bidders’ behaviors and their effectiveness. Due to the limited space of this manuscript, the following 
discussion will highlight some key findings and implications from this study. For the most parts, the three 
main proposed hypotheses are supported by the data. More importantly, most of this study’s results went 
in the direction that we expected. For instance, the HOB auctions drew a significantly larger proportion of 
opportunists than LOB auctions (H1b). We believe that this finding tapped on a domain that has been 
overlooked in online auction research – using a seller’s strategy to draw quality bidders. Opportunists are 
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generally those that are committed to win as indicated by their willingness to stay in the auctions for a 
longer period of time, which consequently produced higher monitoring costs. With such a commitment, 
they won most of the HOB auctions (71.01%) (H2b) and these auctions earned positive price premium. 
While many prior studies purported that opportunists are not the most desirable bidders in online 
auctions (Bapna et al. 2004), we showed that they can enhance price premium of an auction – at least 
when the sellers adopted the HOB strategy. 
We believe that the ability of HOB strategy to draw quality bidders did not reflect only on the group of 
opportunists but also on its other bidder classes. Upon a closer examination, we found that all bidders in 
the HOB auctions are willing to stay longer in the auctions regardless of their other strategies (p = 0.00). 
On average, bidders in the HOB auctions left the auctions 4.65 hours before the auction ended, as 
opposed to 25.45 hours average departure time of bidders in the LOB auctions. Their willingness to stay 
longer in the auctions is indicative of their determination to win – something that helps promote price 
premium in the HOB auctions. We hope that this result open a new forum of research in this area and 
provided an initial evidence showing that seller’s choice of strategy can be used as a mechanism to filter 
out non-serious bidders from the auctions. In addition, auctions that have bidders with stronger 
commitment to win, in this case the HOB auctions, will be rewarded with a higher price premium.   
We also found that the winning likelihood of evaluators, as expected, increased when this strategy is 
adopted in HOB auctions (H2a). In such an auction setting, the opportunity for other bidders to bid 
against an evaluator is limited. Sellers in these auctions have set the auction starting price in close 
proximity to the price ceiling created by prior auctions. In other words, there is very little room for other 
bidders to bid against an evaluator’s bid in an attempt to figure out what the evaluators’ true valuations of 
the item is. Thus, we suggest that bidders that avoid higher monitoring cost (evaluators) should 
participate more in the auctions with higher opening bid to improve their winning likelihood.  
As mentioned earlier, online bidders and sellers adopt different strategies because they have different 
auction goals in mind. The result indicated that most opening bid strategies help fulfill only part, but not 
all, of bidder’s goals with the exception of the LOB and S&D strategies. This study found that the goals of 
S&D bidders are more congruent with the LOB setting. Not only did LOB auctions draw more S&D 
bidders (H1c), it also improved their winning likelihood (H2c) and minimized the total price they paid for 
the auctions (H3c). This is consistent with the concept of using information technology as the incentive 
alignment (Ba et al. 2001) to bidders’ goals.  
Although H3 were proposed in a directionless fashion due to inclusive results from prior studies, the 
current study unveiled that evaluators generated highest possible price premium but only when whey won 
LOB auctions. The LOB setting allows other bidders to bid against evaluators’ bids, creating a bidding war 
and perhaps making bidders more emotionally involved with the competition. This is perhaps what most 
sellers expect from the LOB strategy. Unfortunately, very few LOB auctions were won by evaluators 
(1.59%) and many sellers that opted for this opening bid strategy received a lower price premium at the 
end. A caution should however be made when interpreting this result due to its small sample size.  
Despite the supported hypotheses discussed above, the result revealed that there is no significant 
difference of price premium across the LOB and the HOB auctions won by participators– a finding that is 
not in line with the results from prior study (Bapna et al. 2009) and our expectation (H3d). In addition, 
there is a significantly larger proportion of auctions won by participators in the HOB sample than in the 
LOB sample (H2d). We examined our data at a more granular level and found that a seller’s choice of 
using the LOB strategy can be interfered by some bidding strategies.  
When a seller chooses to set opening bid low, their strategy can be overwritten by competition among 
early evaluators in the auctions. Evaluators generally enter their bids by using their true valuation of the 
items they are bidding on. If there is a competition among this type of bidders early in the auction, the 
auction price will go up exponentially in a short period of time. Their competition will therefore transform 
an LOB auction to an HOB auction. Our further analysis showed that LOB auctions with multiple early 
evaluators have significantly smaller proportion of participators (3.38%) than HOB auctions (X2 = 10.26). 
Early evaluators in these auctions may drive the auction prices even higher than the beginning price of 
HOB auctions in our sample, limiting opportunity for participators to be engaged in the auctions. We 
additionally found that these LOB auctions and the HOB auctions received similar price premium (p = 
0.758). It is because the opening bids of these LOB auctions were replaced by the prices offered by their 
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early evaluators. LOB auctions with no competition among early evaluators however earned significantly 
lower price premium than HOB auctions (p = 0.03). These findings are more in line with our expectation.  
A number of implications can be drawn from this study. We believe that the study offered an important 
explanation to a counterintuitive phenomenon found in the online auction environment. The common 
belief that using the LOB strategy will help enhance the auction price premium because LOB strategy 
helps promote a bidding war has been proven wrong in many studies (i.e. Hergert 2007). There has 
however been very limited explanation to this finding. This study showed that HOB auctions earned 
higher price premium than LOB auctions partly because the high opening bids acts a screening 
mechanism that encourage only quality and committed buyers to participate in the auctions.  
In term of practical implications, we recommend that online auctioneers give a closer look into how 
bidder’s strategies and seller’s strategies interplay. Opportunist is a strategy that has received a bad 
reputation since it was claimed to be detrimental to auction price premium. The current study showed 
that HOB auctions that were won by opportunists received positive price premiums. Thus, a 
recommendation made by other studies to avoid and to discourage opportunist strategy (i.e. Roth and 
Ockenfels 2002) should therefore be reevaluated.  
Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
The current study faced some challenges and limitations. To collect data from eBay, we have limited 
control of what are useful in the final sample. The selection of opening bid ranges can also be considered 
subjective. We however chose these opening bid ranges mainly because they appears to elicit two 
extremes of opening bid strategies which allow us to observe their impacts of bidding strategies more 
clearly. We also recognize that the results of our study may differ when applied to other products. iPad 
was selected as our product of interest partly because electronics is one of the most popular products on 
eBay and its relatively expensive retail price that enables online sellers to adopt different levels of opening 
bids. Sellers that offer inexpensive products generally have very little room to play with their opening bids 
which should in turn affect bidders’ strategy in a different fashion.  
As online auction research continues to grow, we encourage more studies to examine the 
interdependencies between sellers’ and buyer’s strategies.  More importantly, future studies may 
investigate their relationship in the opposite direction. One of the interesting findings of this study 
suggested that the LOB strategy can be overwritten by competition among early evaluators. Such finding 
portraits that their relationship is more complex than most believed and deserves more spotlights from 
researchers in this area.  
Conclusion 
In an attempt to avoid listing fees, many online auction sellers choose to set their opening bids low and 
expect to have more bidders participating in the auctions. This strategy however comes with a price – a 
lower auction price premium. On average, auctions with low opening bids in this study received 
approximately 1.50% lower price premium than auctions with high opening bids in our samples. To offer 
an explanation to such finding, the current study demonstrated that seller’s choice of opening bids 
influenced distributions of bidder classes, which in turn affect their winning likelihood and auction’s price 
premium. We additionally found initial evidence of differences in the level of commitment among bidders 
across the LOB and HOB auctions. Bidders in HOB auctions stayed in the game for a longer period of 
time. We also showed that opportunists, a bidding strategy that is arguably not desirable by many auction 
sellers, can benefit auctions with high opening bids. These are some of the examples of the hidden effect 
of auction opening bids that was unveiled by this study.  
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